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Marching toward the Sweet Spot
Options for the U.S. Marine Corps in a Time of Austerity
Robert P. Kozloski

B

efore leaving his position as Secretary of Defense in 2010, Robert Gates offered a wake-up call in a speech to the Marine Corps Association in 2010: “It
[is] time to redefine the purpose and size of the Marine Corps.” The perception
even then was that the Marine Corps had become too big, too heavy, and too far
removed from its maritime roots.1
Gates further noted, “I directed them [the Secretary of the Navy and Commandant of the Marine Corps] not to lose sight of the Marines’ greatest strengths,
a broad portfolio of capabilities and penchant for adapting that are needed to be
successful in any campaign. The counterinsurgency skills the Marines developed
during this past decade, combined with the agility and esprit honed over two
centuries well positioned the Corps, in my view, to be at the tip of the spear in the
future when the U.S. military is likely to confront a range of irregular and hybrid
conflicts.” He concluded, “Ultimately, the maritime soul of the Marine Corps
needs to be preserved.”2
The Commandant of the Marine Corps at the time, General James Conway,
shared a similar concern that many Marines, although battle hardened by nearly
a decade of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, had never stepped foot on board
a ship. In response to Gates’s challenge, Conway established a Force Structure
Review Group to examine what the force in readiness should look like in the
twenty-first century. The group’s findings were aligned conceptually with Gates’s
observations. The internal assessment concluded that the Marine Corps should
reduce the size of its active component to about 186,000 personnel (a figure
nearly twelve thousand larger than when the recent wars began) and identified its
joint-force operational “sweet spot” as providing formations larger than specialoperations teams but smaller than traditional army units.
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Getting to this sweet spot will be a challenge for the Marine Corps, as it will
have to overcome institutional resistance, generated in no small part by a long,
proud history of operational readiness and combat effectiveness. However, the
Marine Corps must face current realities and adapt both to the changes in the
geopolitical environment and to the dire fiscal problems facing the nation. In
fact, the Marine Corps will likely become even smaller than the size recommend
by the Force Structure Review Group. Therefore, it is critical for the Corps to find
and implement innovative solutions to meet future demands while continuing to
be America’s crisis-response force.
To achieve these ends, the Marine Corps should carefully consider each of Dr.
Gates’s concerns, as they will help it shape the problems it will face as it attempts
to innovate. A constrained defense budget and changes in the operational environment must stimulate efforts to define realistically the Marine Corps purpose
and role within the joint force. There are several options to consider that will help
the service as it prepares for the operational challenges of the twenty-first century
by moving toward organizing for and operating within the newly recognized
sweet spot—all within the context of a shrinking defense budget.
The Proud—but Not So Few
The U.S. Marine Corps may be the smallest of the four U.S. military services,
but it is significantly larger than any other marine or naval infantry in modern
history. For the sake of comparison, figure 1 illustrates how the size of the current Marine Corps compares to those of other naval infantry forces and even
capable military forces of foreign states. The Marine Corps has evolved into a
self-contained military force, the like of which many developed nations might
wish to possess.
It is difficult to make a direct comparison to foreign naval infantries, because
the U.S. Marine Corps is an independent service and therefore must maintain
an appropriate level of overhead in order to execute the requirements of U.S.
Code Title 10, which establishes the legal basis on which the roles, missions, and
organization of each service rest. Also, the Corps dedicates a significant portion
of its force structure to armor and aviation capabilities not normally found in traditional naval infantries.3 Finally, the Marine Corps performs a host of missions
outside the scope of its traditional amphibious role, such as embassy security,
chemical and biological incident response, security cooperation, and security and
transportation for the president.
The minimum size of the Marine Corps is codified in federal statute. According to Title 10, “The Marine Corps, within the Department of the U.S. Navy, shall
be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air
wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss3/3
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therein.”4 Given the aforementioned conditions, it may be time to revisit this
requirement—in terms of both numbers and units of measure.
Determination of the exact “end strength” (that is, the personnel a service requires to accomplish its statutory tasks—technically, the number it is authorized
to have at the end of a fiscal year) of the Marine Corps is extremely subjective.
One approach often employed by military leaders uses the ability to support the
operational plans of the combatant commanders (that is, the geographic and
functional unified commands—Pacific Command, Strategic Command, and so
on) as a critical metric in justifying force structure. Unfortunately, the validity
of this approach is limited by the shortfalls of the defense planning process.5
Defense planning has historically been ineffective and of questionable integrity;6
it should not be a significant consideration in determining future Marine Corps
end strength.
The desire to create a single, integrated, joint force may have taken the services, particularly the Marine Corps, away from their unique strengths. Historically the Marine Corps excelled at taking equipment developed by the U.S. Navy
or Army and modifying it, often at low cost, to support its own concepts. One
consequence of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization
Act of 1986 has been to inject the unified commands into the budgetary and
programming process of the services.7 Each service assigns forces and capabilities to the plans, and its end strength is thereby (as we have seen) justified. The
demands for these capabilities are then reflected in budget submissions to Congress. Currently any serious proposal to reduce force structure begs the response
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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that inability to support combatant commanders’ plans results in an increased
risk to national security. To help alleviate this problem, a recent study from
the Center for a New American Security suggests, services must “challenge the
unconstrained requirements of the combatant commanders” so as to preserve
sustainability of ships and aircraft.8
Another important factor that relates to the size of the Marine Corps is its historical relationship with Congress. Congressional support for the Marine Corps
over the past six decades has been unwavering, and many consider it the most
politically savvy of the services.9 As figure 2 indicates, the Marine Corps end
strength today is larger than at the end of the Cold War, while those of the other
services have dropped significantly during the same period. This congressional
affinity for the Marine Corps may have created a force imbalance that hinders its
operations—reduction in the size of the Navy has made it unable to support fully
the Marine Corps’s amphibious-lift requirements.
However, in recent years, the Marine Corps may have lost some of its elite
status on Capitol Hill and may have expended the political capital necessary to
survive forthcoming fiscal reductions within the Department of Defense (DoD).
As former Senate staffer and author of the Maneuver Warfare Handbook William
S. Lind notes, “The Marine Corps’ clout on Capitol Hill was envied by the other
services. The Marine Corps then had little money and not much interest in programs. Its message to Congress and to the American public was, ‘We’re not like
the other services. We aren’t about money and stuff. We’re about war.’ That message brought the Corps unrivaled public and political support.”10 However, the
figure 2
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acquisition problems of the MV-22 Osprey and Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle
and the demand for a Marine Corps variant of the Joint Strike Fighter may have
changed that perception.
Identity Crisis
While the Marine Corps’s mission is clearly articulated in law, in reality the service is experiencing an identity crisis of sorts.11 As the Center for a New American
Security argues, “Today, the Marine Corps is wrestling with three conflicting
identities: the nation’s amphibious force in readiness, deployed afloat around the
world ready to respond to crises; its small wars force of choice, specializing in irregular warfare; and a middleweight force that serves as the nation’s second land
army, backing up the U.S. Army during prolonged conflicts. This third identity
—fighting in major wars—has dominated the Marines’ combat history from
Belleau Wood to Guadalcanal, from the Chosin Reservoir to Khe Sanh and now
from Fallujah to Marja.”12
To a large extent, the Marine Corps is a victim of its own success. It continually
struggles not to become a second land army, but it does perform exceptionally
well in major ground-combat operations. This was clearly evident in Iraq and
Afghanistan. However, one must ask whether Marine Corps participation in
these land-centric operations was actually required or was simply the effect of the
joint culture—the perception that all services must participate in any significant
combat operation. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army’s 4th Infantry
Division did not arrive in the theater before ground operations commenced, a
clear indication that the Army had enough capacity, if sequenced into the theater
differently, to have conducted the ground war without the Marine Corps. Could
the Marine Corps have been better used for smaller missions, such as seizing and
holding critical objectives—like the capture by the 26th Marine Expeditionary
Unit (Special Operations Capable) of the airfield at Mosul—instead of sending
I Marine Expeditionary Force (Reinforced) to fight side by side with an Army
division?
A robust history of successful operations and inclusion in combatant commanders’ land-centric plans drive Marine Corps investments. As General Conway noted regarding the uniqueness of the Marine Corps, “We’ve got to synergize. We cannot, in my mind, have duplication of effort across the joint force. I
think it is incumbent on each Service to take a look at where we fit in to the whole
patchwork effort of the Department of Defense.”13 However, an examination of
recent budget expenditures indicates the Marine Corps invests heavily in capabilities found in other services rather than those that make it unique.14
Over the past few decades, the Marine Corps appears to have lost an inherent ability that was once its bedrock—that is, combining proportional force with
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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cunning intellect to develop innovative solutions to operational problems. Today
the Marine Corps may have, not unlike the other services, placed excessive institutional faith in extremely costly acquisition programs. In fiscally constrained
times, such programs may marginalize the Marine Corps’s greatest asset, one for
which there is no substitute—Marines.
It would be prudent for the Marine Corps, methodically and with guidance
and direction from the Navy Secretariat, to think through how to maintain its
war-fighting capabilities with a much smaller force. Rather than merely defending the status quo, the Marine Corps must be willing to innovate during this
potential third interwar period, and in a manner that will help preserve its unique
capabilities, which are essential components of the joint force.
The New Reality
As the Marine Corps contemplates how best to evolve as the twenty-first-century
force in readiness, it must contend with two pressing sets of issues. The first
comprises the fiscal realities facing both the nation and the Defense Department.
The second involves changes in the operational environment that may render
existing organizational structures and nonessential mission capabilities obsolete
or simply unaffordable.
Clearly, given the fiscal problems facing the nation and the enormity of the national debt, the defense budget will be under pressure for the foreseeable future.
Despite having funded a decade of war, with questionable return on investment,
it appears as though the American taxpayer will not be afforded the historical
“peace dividend” as operations in Afghanistan cease.15 Nonetheless, even if there
is no reduction to the defense budget, the amount of war-fighting capability obtained by the total obligation (that is, spending) authority of the Marine Corps
will continue to decline for two reasons: the high cost of military personnel and
the reduced purchasing power of acquisition dollars.
As General Conway once noted, “People are expensive. Our manpower accounts constitute about 58 percent of our annual Marine Corps budget.”16 Personnel is the greatest cost driver in the Marine Corps, and unless there are sweeping
reforms to the personnel compensation system for all the U.S. military, personnel
costs will continue to increase. If they continue growing at the current rate, and
the overall defense budget remains flat (allowing for inflation), military personnel costs will consume the entire defense budget by 2039.17
At the same time, the purchasing power of defense dollars is declining. All
components of the Defense Department must deal with the reality that defense
dollars buy less capability each year because of internal cost inflation. As a recent
report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies notes, “[DoD]
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is largely ignoring the fact that the defense budget is being hollowed out from
within and that the reduced purchasing power (in terms of military capabilities) of the defense dollar is digging the hole even deeper.” Further, “a nominal
20 percent defense drawdown may ‘feel’ like a 30–35 percent cut to DoD managers struggling to provide military capabilities to meet the nation’s needs.”18
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments summarizes this dilemma
succinctly:
Overall, nearly half of the growth in defense spending over the past decade is unrelated to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—personnel costs grew while end strength
remained relatively flat, the cost of peacetime operations grew while the pace of
peacetime operations declined, and acquisition costs increased while the inventory of
equipment grew smaller and older. The base budget now supports a force with essentially the same size, force structure, and capabilities as in FY2001 but at a 35 percent
19
higher cost. The Department is spending more but not getting more.”

To exacerbate problems further, as respected analyst Dr. Michael O’Hanlon recently noted, because of overly optimistic budget estimates by DoD, it will have to
come up with $500 billion in additional savings to meet the estimates of the Congressional Budget Office over the next decade: “We are going to have to eliminate
programs and forces just to accomplish the savings goals on the books now.”20
For all these reasons, the Marine Corps, like all the services, will surely be
under increased pressure to reduce the size of its force over the next decade. Can
the Marine Corps realistically expect the other services to absorb the majority of
fiscal cuts, as occurred in the 1990s?
Meanwhile, a host of operational challenges should force the service to reassess its current posture. To its credit, the Marine Corps has undertaken this task
by forming the Ellis Group at Quantico, Virginia, reporting directly to Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.21 This group is important for internal decision making,
but a much broader, even national, discussion needs to occur. The Marine Corps
acknowledges that its capabilities cross into the mission spaces of the three
domain-centric services. What unique capabilities is the Marine Corps to bring
to the American national-security enterprise? Are the remnants of the unique capabilities that it displayed so extraordinarily during World War II and Korea still
relevant in future operational environments? Given the aforementioned fiscal
issues, how much Marine Corps does the nation now actually need? The process
that attempts to answer these questions should not occur in isolation within the
Marine Corps.
The first publicly released report of the Ellis Group identified several emerging threats the Marine Corps will likely encounter and how the current force
structure could be used to counter them.22 They include:
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• Instability and crisis will be persistent features.
• Regional challengers may necessitate larger-scale interventions than in
recent decades.

• Nonstate and hybrid actors are increasing the complexity of the operational
environment.

• Antiaccess and area-denial capabilities will expand.
• Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction persist.
• A “battle of signatures”—electronic, visual, audible, etc.—will be critical to
avoiding detection, especially in the littoral.

• Low-cost area-denial capabilities remain a significant obstacle to operations
in littoral zones.
Given these threats and challenges, and in light of the proliferation of advanced
technology, several new concepts have surfaced over recent years that are ideally
suited for the future Marine Corps.
Distributed MAGTFs. A recent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies prepared for the Department of Defense stressed the importance
to the overall U.S. military posture in the Pacific of establishing “distributed”
Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs), one each in Japan, Guam, Australia,
and Hawaii.23 This distribution of forces would facilitate a variety of missions,
including training and exercises with partner nations and contingency response
for humanitarian disaster-recovery missions, and it would form the nucleus of
a crisis-response force for speedy insertion into partner nations under attack.24
Underlying the distributed MAGTF organizational structure is the principle of
“the fingers and the fist.”25 That is, the “fingers,” or smaller units, have the ability
to conduct operations independently, but as the operational situation demands,
they can aggregate to form a heavier “fist.”
Deep Operations. The Marine Corps should further develop the capability to
conduct “deep operations” launched from sea bases or other platforms. The concept relies on the notion of identifying critical gaps in enemy-held terrain and
quickly exploiting them before the adversary can respond effectively. It was as
part of such an operation during Iraqi Freedom that, as mentioned previously,
Marines seized the critical airfield complex at Mosul, far behind enemy defenses.
Infantry battalions must be capable of conducting operations deep within
enemy-held battle space, as did the Marine Corps Raider battalions of World War
II.26 These units need to organize and train for dispersed, small-unit, fleet reconnaissance and strike operations, as well as raids on high-value enemy network targets.
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Forward-Base Seizure and Defense. Many consider the Air-Sea Battle operational concept purely a Navy–Air Force endeavor. In fact, however, the Marine Corps
would certainly have a role in seizing and defending advanced bases, particularly
on remote islands. Seizing forward operating bases may enable the Marines or
joint forces to conduct a variety of operations, including unmanned surveillance;
electronic or directed-energy attack; the boarding, search, and seizure of vessels;
and even “swarm” operations against formations of the People’s Liberation Army
Navy.27
Enforcement of Offshore Control. The emerging strategy of “offshore control” for
the undesirable and unlikely scenario of having to confront China with military
force would mean remarkable opportunities for the Marine Corps. Briefly, offshore control involves a distant blockade of China, with a set of concentric rings
that would deny China use of the sea inside the “first island chain” (running from
the Kuriles through Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines to Borneo), defend
the sea and air space of the first island chain, and dominate the air and maritime
domains outside the chain.28
This type of operation would be ideally suited for the Marine Corps, particularly in conducting contested boardings or defending friendly or cooperative
commercial traffic against interdiction. The geographic area and the number of
vessels involved would be significant and would require the Marine Corps to
operate from a variety of platforms in a highly distributed manner.
Nonlethal Capabilities. Changes to the operational battlefield and the global
trend toward avoidance of high casualties from military operations may expand the use of nonlethal weapons well beyond the original purpose of crowd
control. As Colin Gray notes, during irregular conflicts in the future the U.S.
armed forces “will need to curb their traditional, indeed cultural, love affair with
firepower.”29
Effective employment of nonlethal weapons may prove to be a critical niche
role for the Marine Corps in the joint force. The service has historically viewed
itself as “no better friend; no worse enemy,” and this belief would well serve a
force that can quickly flex from nonlethal to lethal and back again as the situation dictates.
In the future, nonlethal weapons will play a critical role in crisis response,
providing policy makers as they do with more options between diplomacy and
economic sanctions, on one hand, and the conventional use of force, on the other.
Such new options may be critical to preventing escalation and enabling intervention at a lower threshold of conflict than is now possible.30
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These emerging concepts for the Marine Corps have common threads: relatively
small units, agile organizations, distributed and decentralized operations, and
tight linkage to the maritime environment. The Marine Corps has been considering distributed operations, operational maneuvers from the sea, and other nowvaluable concepts for the better part of the last decade. To turn these concepts
into actual capabilities, the Marine Corps will have to orient and commit itself
intellectually, institutionally, and organizationally to solving the actual operational problems involved.31
The following options might assist leaders within the Department of the Navy
and the national policy community in considering changes to adapt the Marine
Corps to twenty-first-century challenges. They represent fiscally responsible approaches to organizing the service’s capabilities and integrating them with those
of other elements of the joint force—for though the Marine Corps will likely
become smaller, it will continue to play a critical role in American defense.
Think Naval
A Brookings Institution scholar recently argued that the greatest challenge that
lies ahead for the Marine Corps is not repercussions from the termination of its
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program but rather the very nature of coordination between the Corps and the U.S. Navy. That is, the author holds, whether the
subject is concepts of sea basing, assumptions about assault and transport shipbuilding plans, or the Marines’ role in the development and execution of Air-Sea
Battle doctrine, the alignment within the Marine/Navy team is not as seamless as
it should be.32 This challenge, however, is one that also presents great opportunities for the Marine Corps.
The present situation is not unlike that of the 1990s. With the end of the Cold
War there was emphasis on evolving the force to counter the threats posed in the
new geopolitical environment. Also like today, there was fiscal pressure to shrink
the force, so as to reap the benefits of the so-called peace dividend. These two
factors were instrumental in reinvigorating Navy–Marine Corps integration. The
two services had to reenergize an operational partnership that had lapsed since
the end of the Korean War. In large measure, the 1990s can be seen as a period of
operational reappraisal and debate between and within these two sea services on
the extent and ramifications of their renewed operational partnership.33
The naval services have recognized the need to continue to pursue naval integration and have taken several important steps toward this end. One, known as the
“Single Naval Battle” concept, provides an overarching vision of how the services
must work together to offer the nation strategic value and operational effectiveness. Specifically, “this new approach to planning and execution allows functional
warfare communities and individual naval services to better understand their
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss3/3
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relationship to the broader naval and joint forces, identify critical dependencies,
optimize forces, ensure compatibility and increase partnerships.”34
While naval operational integration has received various degrees of leadership
attention over the years, it is critical that enduring structures and processes be
put in place to ensure that the capabilities of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps
are integrated and nonredundant in mission areas of common interest. In May
2011 the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Chief of Naval Operations
agreed to reestablish the Naval Board—originally the Navy General Board, an
advisory body that operated valuably from 1900 to 1951. The revived board will
“identify naval war fighting, operational employments and force development
issues that should be considered in order to optimize the contributions of the
naval services across the range of military operations in the naval domain.”35
While this is an important first effort, there is certainly room for improvement.
It is unlikely that full cooperation will ever be achieved among service leaders
when competing interests are present. As fiscal pressure increases, so too will
the competition for limited resources. Adding the Navy Secretariat—particularly
the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Plans, Policy, Oversight, and
Integration—to this forum would ensure that the secretary’s strategic guidance
was fully considered and provide a mediator for contentious issues. This leadership triad works well in other departmentwide governance structures, such as the
figure 3
levels of naval integration
Department of the Navy’s Business Transformation Council. The Naval Board is an
excellent forum in which to discuss toplevel integration, but other measures should
be put in place as well to ensure that inteNaval Board
gration flows through all echelons of command. Figure 3 depicts three levels of naval
Policy/Strategy
integration.
In any case, the Naval Board meets periodically to discuss various topics; it canNaval Executive
not be focused on any single mission area.
Agents
In mission areas of shared interest, offices
Mission Area Integration
should be assigned responsibility as “Naval
Executive Agents,” to make recommendations to the Naval Board.36 Figure 4 lists
Naval Commands
mission areas of interest to both services.
The organizations assigned should not be
Tactical Execution
specially formed but rather be existing commands with the preponderance of resources
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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Figure 4
Naval mission areas
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or expertise in the specific mission area needed to fill this new role. A Naval
Executive Agent should seek opportunities to integrate fully Navy and Marine
Corps capabilities, doctrine, and even organizations within the mission area.
This approach could be applied to a host of mission areas: special operations, intelligence, cyberspace operations, civil affairs, information operations, irregular
warfare, or electronic warfare, for example.
At the tactical level, new organizational structures must be considered to combine capabilities and reduce unnecessary overhead. This is not the first time the
Navy and Marine Corps have struggled with the problem of how best to integrate
their efforts in common mission areas. In 1990, the commander of the Naval Special Warfare Command, Admiral G. R. Worthington, conducted a detailed study
on how the Navy and Marine Corps should organize for riverine warfare.37 The
Worthington Study, as it became known, recommended the creation of a Mobile
Riverine Force that would integrate a MAGTF and a Navy river assault group.
This concept was not acted on, because of the low priority given to riverine warfare during the budget reductions of the 1990s, but the concept remains valid and
could be applied to a number of operational areas.
Riverine operations have never been fully embraced as an enduring mission
for either service, but the concept of a truly naval command is worthy of serious consideration, particularly in operational mission areas of interest to both
services. Intelligence, naval special operations, civil affairs, information operations, and logistics all present opportunities for truly naval structures as Admiral
Worthington recommended. In other areas, such as cyberwarfare, the most beneficial alignment may be to have one service provide capabilities for both.
By examining the mission commonalities across the naval services, “trade
space” can be identified. For example, if the Navy’s Seabees were trained and
equipped for the full spectrum of engineering operations, from breaching to

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss3/3

12

ko z l o s k i	
23

Kozloski: Marching toward the Sweet Spot

Figure 5
New naval expeditionary force
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Notes: NEF = naval expeditionary force; GCE = ground combat element; ace = air combat element; LCE = logistics combat element.

building, would the Marine Corps need a large cadre of combat engineers? Could
a portion of that manpower be repurposed for different forms of engineering,
such as expeditionary “3-D” manufacturing?38 This kind of cross-service analysis
could not only develop naval operational capabilities but also yield a variety of
opportunities to improve both the Navy and Marine Corps.
Significant personnel reductions could certainly be achieved through naval
integration; however, it is difficult to determine whether the reductions would
come from the Marine Corps or from the Navy. For instance, the expeditionary capabilities currently organized under the Naval Expeditionary Combat
Command might be more efficiently organized by attaching them to the Marine
Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), thus creating a true naval expeditionary force, as
depicted in figure 5.
It’s Hard to Be Special
Special operations forces have played an increasingly prominent role in military
operations over the past two decades. From the early 1980s to 2005, when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed the Marine Corps to become part
of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the Marine Corps resisted
inclusion in the special operations community. Today, however, recognizing
that special operations will play a critical role in future military operations, the
Marine Corps is faced with the challenge of how best to integrate its unique capabilities with those of the special operations community without compromising
traditional mission competence or service culture. With a decade of growth in the
capabilities of the Naval Special Warfare community, the question of how much
is enough must be asked. Determining how the Marine Corps can fit into this
increasingly crowded mission space without redundancy is a problem the service
is currently struggling to solve.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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In 2005, in response to the directive to become part of USSOCOM, the Marine
Corps established Marine Special Operations Command. MARSOC added to the
existing capacity in the direct-action, special-reconnaissance, foreign internal
defense, and counterterrorism SOF (special operation forces) disciplines. The
question remains of how to integrate the rest of the Marine Corps, when appropriate, into special operations missions while under fiscal pressure to reduce the
size of the force.
First, the current fiscal problems facing the entire DoD should force leaders
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the services to
assess realistically what capabilities are ideally suited for each service. This assessment may result in a realignment of capabilities. While any encroachment
on missions currently performed by a service will be met with stiff resistance,
services may also see opportunities to expand into emerging mission areas.
One such capability that should be reexamined through this lens is the Air
Force’s special tactics squadrons (STSs) and the Marines’ air-naval gunfire liaison
companies (ANGLICOs). The STSs comprise three elements: combat controllers, specially trained to conduct air traffic control and coordinate precision fire
support (both close-air support and battlefield air interdiction) while embedded
within SOF ground units; special operations weathermen, who provide accurate,
local weather forecasts while forward deployed in hostile environments; and
para-rescue men. This Air Force capability is remarkably similar to what some
experts consider could be an important contribution of the Marine Corps to the
joint force in the future. As Jim Thomas, the director of research at the Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, noted in testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee, “Small teams of highly distributed / highly mobile
Marines could conduct low-signature amphibious landings and designate targets
ashore for bombers and submarines as a vanguard force in the early stages of a
blinding campaign.”39
The current Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy, Robert Martinage, recommended in 2008 that the Air Force double the number of STSs, in order to
provide steady-state support to each special forces group, Naval Special Warfare
Groups 1 and 2, the Rangers, and MARSOC.40 He also pointed out numerous
other opportunities for the Air Force to expand its SOF portfolio. However, the
fiscal realities of today will likely prevent earnest consideration of some of these
recommendations for expansion. Transferring the STS mission set to the Marine
Corps would free up resources to develop Air Force–unique capabilities. With
the exception of the para-rescue men, the Marine Corps already possesses similar
capabilities, and increasing the number of ANGLICO units may provide a reasonable way to bridge the gap between the special operations community and the
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Marine Corps. While the Marine Corps historically has been loath to create or
maintain elite teams that would operate outside the MAGTF construct, the complexity of future challenges will likely require such unprecedented integration.
A second approach to special operations integration can be achieved through
application of the previously discussed Naval Executive Agent concept to naval
special operations. When originally developing the Marine Expeditionary Unit
(Special Operations Capable) concept, the Marine Corps developed a list of special operations missions outside the scope of traditional missions. As battalions
—with their associated aviation, logistics, and command components—work toward deployment as Marine expeditionary units (MEUs), they progress through
a series of progressively more challenging training events and exercises that
establish their ability to conduct these nontraditional missions. The workups
culminate in a certification exercise certifying the MEU as “special operations
capable” and the amphibious ready group in which it is to embark as ready for
deployment.41 The list of missions has broadly remained the same since the inception of the program.
An alternate approach would be for USSOCOM to develop the list of special
operations missions needed within the maritime domain and appropriate for a
MEU-sized force. In effect this list would collect USSOCOM missions that the
Marine Corps could perform. If the Naval Special Warfare Command, for example, were the Naval Executive Agent for naval special operations, it would be
responsible for certification of MEUs and ensure that their capabilities were fully
integrated with other Navy Special Warfare / special operations missions. This
process change would fully integrate the Marine Corps with the special operations community and yet not infringe on the MAGTF construct or the authority
of the MEU commander. Figure 6 outlines the proposed relationships.
Figure 6
proposed special operations relationships
Mission
Requirements

HQ USMC

Man, Train,
Equip

SOCOM

Coordinate

Integrated Naval
Special Operations
Capabilities
NEA
Special Operations
Certify, Integrate

MEU

Notes: HQ USMC = Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps; SOCOM = U.S. Special Operations Command; NEA = Naval Executive Agent.
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A permanent MARSOC contribution to the U.S. Special Operations Command and a broader use of ANGLICO units represent fiscally responsible solutions for the Marine Corps–SOF integration dilemma.
Restructure the Operating Forces
For decades, expert practitioners within the Marine Corps have seen a need to
restructure its operating forces.42 The duplication of MAGTF headquarters and
traditional unit headquarters has been of particular concern. As Under Secretary
of the Navy Robert Work noted in 2002,
By layering standing MAGTF headquarters over their old organizational structures,
the Marines paid a heavy price in staff overhead. In 1989, for example, there were
headquarters for Atlantic and Pacific Marine forces, three large MEFs, six MEBs [Marine expeditionary brigades], and seven MEUs. These were in addition to the three
Division, three Wing and three Force Service Support Group headquarters, as well
as 12 regimental and 11 air group headquarters, giving the Corps a total of 50 higher
43
unit headquarters!

In general, such scholars as Dr. Eliot Cohen and Dr. Francis Fukuyama have
argued that military organizations have failed to evolve over the past half-century.
Specifically, Cohen compares our current organizational structure with that of
General Motors in the 1950s. He notes that many successful corporations have
adapted away from this traditional hierarchical model by stripping out layers of
middle management and reducing or eliminating the functional distinction between management and labor.44 For his part, Fukuyama points out that whereas
organizations are originally created around efficient internal information flow,
military organizations have not changed commensurately with advances in information technology.45 Opportunities exist to create flatter organizations, with
more emphasis on the capabilities of smaller operational units.
As mentioned previously, the Force Structure Review Group concluded correctly that the Marine Corps “sweet spot” with respect to the joint force lies between a traditional army unit (regiment) and a special operations team (platoon).
Therefore, the Marine Corps should emphasize the company and battalion levels.
The goal of any effort to reorganize the operating forces must be to preserve actual war-fighting capacity; an inefficient system should not be maintained solely
for the sake of officer career development or tradition. The fiscal issues facing
the Marine Corps should force its leadership to make organizational changes that
reflect increased emphasis on smaller-unit operations and eliminate redundancy.
To this end, two approaches should be considered.
Horizontal Realignment. As the Marine Corps shifts to operations at the battalion and company levels, the need for headquarters at the regimental and group
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Figure 7
notional mef horizontal alignment
ISR
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MARFORCOM
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Logistics
Battalions

Infantry
Battalions

ACE
TYCOM

LCE
TYCOM

MEB

Aviation
Squadrons

Logistics
Battalions

Infantry
Battalions

Aviation
Squadrons

Notes: TYCOM = type commander; isR = intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

levels and above comes into question. Could an entire level of command be
eliminated with no effect on operational capability? For instance, could regiments and groups (which are commanded by colonels) be eliminated, leaving
tactical units to report directly to a one-star (brigadier general) command?
Eliminating the regimental headquarters from the three active Marine divisions could yield a reduction of between seven hundred and a thousand personnel in the ground-combat element alone. Extrapolate this process across the
aviation and logistics elements, and the personnel savings could reach three
thousand. If wing, division, and logistic group headquarters were included, the
total could approach five, even seven, thousand.
To ensure consistency across the operating forces, the equivalent of “type commanders” for each of the three combat elements should be created (responsible
for training and readiness functions unique to ground, aviation, and logistics
elements, respectively). A single office for each discipline would be embedded
within Marine Forces Command. The flexibility of this approach would rely
heavily on the service’s inherent ability to create ad hoc task organizations in response to operational demands. Figure 7 depicts a notional organizational layout.
Vertical Realignment. A shortcoming of horizontal reorganization is that if executed to the fullest extent it would violate the current statutory requirement
to maintain three divisions and three wings, although there would be no loss of
actual combat power. An alternative that is compliant with current legislation
would be to consolidate organizations vertically. To start, merge the three Marine
Expeditionary Force headquarters into two and consolidate the operating forces
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Figure 8
notional vertical realignment
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under I MEF and II MEF, as shown in figure 8. Although this would create imbalance between the two remaining MEFs, it would support the overall DoD pivot
to the Asia-Pacific.
Second, identify for consolidation elements of Marine Forces Command and
Marine Corps Forces, Pacific. A single Marine Corps organization is capable of responding to the force demands of each of the geographic combatant commanders.
Vertical realignment would not realize the same personnel reductions as the
horizontal approach; only one to three thousand staff billets could be eliminated.
But additional savings would be achieved by reductions in the overseas “footprint” and in costs of moving personnel and their households.
Use the Total Force
Because the Marine Corps is the smallest and most agile of the services, it has an
opportunity to lower the cost associated with personnel in the active component
while preserving operational capacity. The approach the Marine Corps must
take—that is, total-force management—is consistent with recent changes to Title
10 of the U.S. Code.46 Because of its cultural emphasis on readiness, the service is
in an excellent position to support the new DoD-wide concept of “reversibility.”47
Reserves at the Ready. The Marine Corps prides itself as being the nation’s force
in readiness. This commitment permeates the reserve component as thoroughly
as it does the active component. There has been much discussion of a shift by the
United States toward its militia roots in order to survive future fiscal austerity.48
The Marine Corps Reserve provides the nation an important surge capacity, as
it does not need an extensive period of time to achieve an acceptable level of operational readiness.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss3/3
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The Marine Corps Reserve was one of the success stories of Iraqi Freedom.
Its members showed that they were skilled warriors and performed as advertised.
They were able to muster, train, deploy, and fight not as second-stringers but as
highly motivated, highly competent Marines.49
As we have seen, the Marine Corps is struggling to balance three identities:
those of the forward-deployed amphibious force, the small-wars force of choice,
and a force that fights the nation’s major land wars. The majority of capabilities
necessary for the third identity should be shifted to the reserve component. Tank,
artillery, engineer, and aviation command-and-control units intended to support
a wing-level force could be moved to the reserves without putting the nation’s
crisis response at risk.
“Civilian Marines.” Historically the Marine Corps has done well at institutionalizing the concept of “civilian Marines” in the total-force mix. However, there
are many areas where civilians can be leveraged further. Entire career fields for
military personnel can be eliminated and replaced by less-expensive civilians.50
For example, financial services, acquisition, and comptroller career fields could
be civilianized entirely. According to the 2011 Marine Corps Almanac, the Marine
Corps has over 1,700 personnel in the financial management specialty alone.51
The Defense Department has effectively implemented the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce program, which permits civilians to deploy to operational
environments.52 Selected “civilian Marines” filling billets once held by military
personnel should, as a condition of employment, be required to sign agreements
stating their willingness and readiness to deploy to austere and potentially hostile environments. This practice has worked well over the past decade within
the intelligence community, where civilians routinely provide forward-deployed
intelligence support to war fighters.
Expanded Use of Enlisted Marines. The cornerstone of the Marine Corps is the
Marine rifleman. In part due to the struggling economy, today’s enlisted Marines
are among the best educated and trained in the history of the Marine Corps.
Some futurists predict that unemployment problems will worsen over the next
several decades, as automated systems replace humans in manufacturing jobs;
they estimate that 10–20 percent unemployment could become the norm in the
United States for the foreseeable future.53 Anything like such a social environment as that could present an excellent opportunity for the Marine Corps to enlist and keep better-educated civilians.
The Marine Corps should actively look for billets currently filled by officers
that might be filled as well or better by top-performing enlisted personnel. Aviation fields will likely provide opportunities. From 1916 to 1981 the Navy, Marine
Corps, and Coast Guard used enlisted pilots in a variety of ways.54 Today, a large
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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percentage of the Army’s helicopter pilots are warrant officers—clearly indicating that a four-year college degree and a commission are not required. Enlisted
pilots should also form the nucleus of the unmanned-vehicle operator corps of
the future.
While transitioning billets from officer to enlisted will not change endstrength numbers, it could achieve a cost savings with no loss of operational
capacity. This is an essential premise for a total workforce reshaping.
Marine Corps Aviation
As we have just seen, no examination of Marine Corps force structure or of overlapping capabilities within DoD is complete without discussion of Marine aviation. This has been a contentious issue since the service-unification movement
following World War II, and it remains so today.
In 1976 General Robert Cushman, Jr., until the previous year Commandant
of the Marine Corps, addressed the justification for the Marine Corps’s having
its own tactical air force. He argued that the Marine Corps represented a unique
capability with its full spectrum of combined-arms integration and that if there
were a reduction in its tactical aviation, the gap would need to be filled by another service.55 Making tactical air an integral component of Marine air-ground
tasks forces has unquestionably enabled effective, integrated air/ground “fires”
within the Marine Corps. This integration is particularly striking in comparison
to that between the Army and Air Force—a 2006 study found that despite twenty
years of joint reform brought on by Goldwater-Nichols, the Army and Air Force
were still having difficulty integrating their operational capabilities in Iraq and
Afghanistan.56
Because of the austere times the nation faces, however, the Marine Corps may
have to accept a tactical-air mix that is only “good enough,” one that does not
include high-end capabilities such as the F-35B, the short-takeoff-and-verticallanding variant of the Lightning II multirole fighter.57 Against the background
of fiscal trade-offs that will have to occur in the future, this expensive platform
comes at a high cost in terms of other Marine Corps operational needs.
An affordable mix of tactical air for direct support of smaller infantry units
may be composed of rotary-wing, unmanned platforms and modified cargo
aircraft—such as the KC-130J Harvest Hawk, a gunship variant, already in the
Marine Corps inventory, of the Super Hercules transport and aerial-refueling
aircraft. Another option to consider is to modify the MV-22 Osprey in a new
gunship variant. The new mix should reflect the differing needs for fixed-wing
close air support during local contingency operations and major theater operations. The Marine Corps could safely assume greater risk in the former by relying
primarily on the Navy for fixed-wing close air support; again, new organizational
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss3/3
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alignments could facilitate cooperation between Navy squadrons and Marine
Corps ground units. An additional benefit would be that Navy aviators would
gain valuable experience in support of Marine Corps ground units as well as SOF.
In contrast, Marine fixed-wing units for the support of major theater operations
could be moved to the reserve component; such operations have historically afforded some time for buildup of forces.
One commonly used argument in favor of Marine Corps tactical aviation is
commonality in training among ground personnel and aviators. After a decade
of supporting ground-centric operations, the perceived schism between Navy
fixed-wing tactical aviators and ground units may no longer be as wide as it once
was. Also, current Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization
qualifications are the same for Marine and Navy aviators flying identical aircraft,
ensuring commonality in close air support missions.
Finally, the Marine Corps relies primarily on aviators to serve as forward air
controllers, while other services rely on enlisted “joint terminal attack controllers” to integrate air support with ground forces. Well-qualified enlisted Marines
could certainly perform this function for Marine ground units.
Initial Accessions
Finally, as fiscal issues force the Marine Corps to consider reductions in end
strength, opportunities to reduce initial-accession infrastructure will become
apparent. As the demand to bring in more new enlisted Marines decreases,
the service should consider closing one of the two current recruit depots and
consolidating all recruit training in a single facility. The Navy successfully took
this approach during the 1990s. Should the need arise for another surge of enlisted Marines—as witnessed during the Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq conflicts—
temporary facilities could be constructed at Quantico, Virginia, or Twentynine
Palms, California, to handle the increased throughput.
The Marine Corps maintains a regional structure for recruiting commands,
with separate organizations for the East Coast and the West Coast. The recruitingcommand infrastructure could be streamlined to accommodate all Marine recruiting within a single organization.
The table summarizes the options the Marine Corps should consider as fiscal
pressure and the rising cost of personnel force a reduction in active-component
end strength. These proposed options overlap and so should be considered individually, not in the aggregate.
Twenty years before the start of World War II, Marine lieutenant colonel Pete
Ellis foretold the challenges that lay ahead for America in the Pacific. His ability
to see through the fog of uncertainty gave rise to a wide array of doctrinal and
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Option

Estimated Potential Personnel Changes

Notes

Naval integration

under 2,000 to 10,000

May result in increase in Navy numbers to take
on additional responsibility. Total net reduction within Dept. of Navy could be achieved.

Special operations

over 1,200 to 1,800

Greater personnel reductions could be realized
in other services.

Restructure operating
forces

under 2,000 to 7,000

Total-force mix

under 500 to 7,000

Marine aviation

under 3,000 to 10,000

Initial accessions

under 500 to 1,000

Includes options to reduce cost of personnel
but not to change size of total force.
Would increase Navy end strength.
Includes reduction in “civilian Marines.”

conceptual changes within the Marine Corps that eventually brought the successful amphibious campaigns of the Pacific War. Today’s Marine Corps leaders
are faced with the equally daunting task of dealing with the uncertainties of a
complex and constantly evolving national security environment, challenges made
more difficult by a strained American economy and a government mired, at this
writing, in partisan gridlock.
The Marine Corps has a long history of maintaining a high state of operational
readiness and of responding with high combat effectiveness to challenges facing
the nation. The smallest of the U.S. military services, it has demonstrated great
agility in adapting to and overcoming adversity, on and off the battlefield. As the
Marine Corps transitions from a decade of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, it will now be required to demonstrate institutional agility once again.
To remain an effective and affordable national crisis-response force, it will
need to adapt to the changes in the geopolitical environment and, equally important, to fiscal realities. In doing so it must consider the thought, quoted above, of
Robert Gates—that the Marine Corps has become too big, too heavy, and too far
removed from its amphibious roots. By addressing these issues the Marine Corps
will discover opportunities to reshape itself to achieve its “sweet spot” within the
joint force.
We may argue that only as a last resort should the Marine Corps be targeted
to free up defense dollars, but the reality is it will likely be caught up in an overall
effort to shrink the armed forces after a decade of war. There are ways to conform
to fiscal demands while not only preserving operational capacity but better preparing the Marine Corps for future operational challenges. By achieving effective
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss3/3

22

Kozloski: Marching toward the Sweet Spot

ko z l o s k i	
33

integration with the U.S. Navy, the joint force, and the special operations community; by restructuring its own operating forces; and by better utilizing its total
workforce, the Marine Corps can remain America’s crisis response force—ready
to meet the demands of the twenty-first century.
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